Map of Clientelism MD

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Autor: Ion MELEȘTEAN, Expert Grup

The analysis concerning the National Ecological Fund, the Social Investment Fund, the Energy Efficiency Fund shows that regardless of the governing party / alliance, the mayors affiliated to it / her were more likely to receive project funds through the instruments analyzed financially than those in the opposition and the independent ones. Thus, the ruling party or coalition uses public budget resources to favor affiliated mayors in order to retain their support and to attract voters for the next parliamentary elections.

A maximum index of political clientelism was identified in 2012 in relation to the annexes to the national budgets (capital investments) when, on average, it was 6 times more likely to receive funds if you were affiliated to the governing alliance, than if you were a mayor of the opposition. In 2015, the index of political clientelism shows that the probability of receiving funds was on average four times higher for all transfer instruments (except for the capital investment instrument, who was lower).

Map developed within the project Combating Clientelism in Local Investments and Financial Transfers (CC-LIFT) suppored by Open Society Foundations and implemented by Expert Forum (România) in partnership with Expert Grup (Moldova) and Institute for Development of Freedom of Information (Georgia).
Co-financed through a project supported by The Rule of Law Program South East Europe of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.