European
MEDIA AND
INFORMATION
Fund

Managed by
Calouste Gulbenkian
Foundation

EXPERT FORUM

WAR IN UKRAINE

Overview of a Year of Aggression

ROMANIA

Online Monitoring in Romania

Weaponizing the energy crisis against the European Union

Source Crowdtangle

Context

The invasion of Ukraine has drastically changed the social media consumption habits in the region, at least in the first months of the war. TikTok became one of the main places where Ukrainians were showing real-life proof of the damage the Russian invasion had done, while Facebook groups, Discord, Whatsapp, and Telegram were also used intensely for mobilizing humanitarian aid and accommodating Ukrainian refugees. Worldwide, the war in Ukraine became a viral topic.

How so? 75% of Ukrainians use the internet, according to the International Telecommunication Union, part of the UN.

By comparison, in 2015, only 30% of Syria's population was online. Among other things this had a significant impact on reducing the effectiveness of Russian propaganda online; Ukraine became a success story and a precedent in countering disinformation from the Kremlin.

However, even if the informational war has been won so far by Ukraine, disinformation has other means of eroding support for Ukraine and seeding instability in the Black Sea region.

In Romania, a combination of a lack of effective government communication and late or no official answers to the toxic narratives surrounding the energy crisis created a favorable environment for far-righters and nationalists to spread the blame for rising prices according to their own agenda. Entities such as the Ministry of Energy were an easy target, due to their own ineptitude, for the ultra-nationalists who blame the Western powers for the worsening living conditions, and the institutions for being the puppets of these foreign actors.

In the last year, the energy crisis alone had over 7.9 million interactions in Romania and over 46.000 posts on Facebook. If we add public groups and verified profiles (public profiles) to the list the numbers go up as far as 9.2 million interactions and 136 000 posts.

Common online themes. Key Findings

Facebook Lives is a new technique to gather large numbers of people on Facebook in order to spread disinformation. They are organized in the same format as popular shows on TV channels, with guests from different areas of expertise addressing a specific topic.

One popular case is Zeus TV, a channel that mainly promotes itself on Facebook. The channel is built around the personality of its main host, Luis Lazarus, an influencer promoting a nationalist agenda in Romania and a supporter of Diana Şoşoacă, a former member of AUR, now believed to be a pro-Russian public figure in Romania.

Second, Stiripesurse.ro is one of the top sources addressing the energy crisis, an online media outlet that is known for spreading target disinformation towards state institutions and subtly promoting anti-Western content.

Their latest acquisition in this sense is Dana Budeanu, a celebrity-style influencer. She nevertheless penetrated the mainstream by making controversial statements, taking anti-NATO/EU positions, and spreading borderline conspiracy narratives.

She now has her own app called "Verdict" where she advertises her shows addressing various current social issues. Stiripesurse.ro has a large base of followers: at least 13 million visit their website monthly. Offering this platform to Dana Budeanu is clearly a deliberate decision to endorse and normalize her cranky, conspiratorial views for the broader Romanian online audience.

Another interesting source that made it to the online top with subjects related to energy is Gheorghe Piperea a commercial lawyer.

He is advocating for economic nationalism and is repackaging the old narrative of autarchy and self-reliance, which are code language for anti-West and anti-NATO views, for a more upmarket audience searching for conspiracies in technocratic dressing. He has 157 000 followers on his Facebook page and is a particularly interesting case, being not only a practicing lawyer but also a professor at the School of Law of the University of Bucharest, one of the most prestigious faculties in the country.



Viral messages

● Ursula von der Leyen is responsible for increasing energy, fuel, and food prices in the EU. Ursula von der Leyen is directly responsible for the increase in energy, fuel, and food prices in the EU as a result of utopian goals and means to combat carbon emissions.

Over 1 million reach online

● The Ministry of Energy is responsible for the Energy crisis.

Over 2 million reach online

Energy prices are artificially increased. Romania is able to produce energy for its citizens and we should suffer 0 consequences for what is happening in the EU.

RTV promotes Dana Budeanu the fashion designer, who explains the mechanism by which the price of energy is artificially increased when it should not be: "Dear Romanians, Romania has no connection, zero, from the point of view of electricity with the EU, with anyone. Romania produces electricity for all citizens."

● The energy crisis is deliberately planned to make Romanians poor.
(Romania TV live on Facebook, 300 000 reach + 4.200 shares)
Food is going to become a luxury for Romanians, the Romanian army will start recruiting and the energy crisis is meant to force Romanians into bankruptcy.

Potential impact: are these narratives trying to erode support for Ukraine?

*Evaluation made with the help of the IRI Beacon Project. Graphs from IRI Regional Dashboard evaluating Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechia, Slovakia, Ukraine, and Russia.

20% of the content analyzed in the interval February 2022-February 2023 was potentially hostile. the 179.144 pieces of content (articles, posts), 37.374 were potentially hostile based on keyword filtering. The energy crisis needs to be addressed in the context of the war in Ukraine as it is a narrative that can erode support for Ukraine, mainly because public attention is focused on internal issues.

Most TV channels like **Romania TV (Rtv)** make sensationalist claims like “Romania will go bankrupt”, “the energy crisis is unbearable”, and such apocalyptic scenarios in order to reduce the trust in official institutions and shift the attention away from the war to domestic issues which sound legitimate.

The blame for the energy crisis is almost never attributed to Russia’s aggression and policies in 2020-2021. On the other hand, narratives that exclusively blame the EU and national governments for the crisis are flourishing. However, the blame for the energy crisis is almost never attributed to Russia directly.

Without proper context and explaining why the war and the crisis are both sparked by Russia, there is an open path to misinformation. We shouldn’t let the idea that indirectly the war in Ukraine is at fault for the energy crisis without also assigning blame to Russia. Thus, people become less and less interested in supporting a war that diminishes their quality of life.

It creates the illusion that Romania is making a choice in supporting Ukraine that has repercussions for its own citizens.

The energy crisis was frequently used after the 2022 invasion started in order to seed fear and uncertainty: we detected spikes in conversations at the beginning of October concerning the winter crisis. Yet, as the winter in Romania and the rest of Europe was quite mild and almost nonexistent in certain regions, the narrative fell flat and fizzled out. We analyze here two spikes in virality (reach) of the energy topic in Romania with potentially hostile content.

The first one was registered in March, when Cristian Terheş, a radical Romanian MEP member of a Christian Democratic Party, made a statement against Canadian prime-minister Justin Trudeau, blaming like-minded Western leaders like him for the crisis and for enabling Russia to get rich. Starting from a factual basis, his statements were nevertheless pointing to the general conclusion that we have to reject altogether the West and its leadership.

The alternative? Not explicitly mentioned, apart from the references to human rights and Faith in God; such postings reached 16 000 likes and had 3000 shares. On the other hand, Gheorghe Piperea, mentioned above in this report as an anti-Western influencer, was heavily speculating about a presumed Romanian energy crisis artificially created by our so-called "war overlord", meaning Western powers.

The second one was noted on September 1st when a Tucker Carlson video became viral on the Romanian language internet. Only the page of Sebastian Suciu, a member of the AUR party, had over 266 000 views. The point of the video is to claim that the sanctions against Russia, together with the energy crisis, will take us back to the Dark Ages, and therefore that the cost of the war is too high for our civilization to pay.

Overall, the energy crisis was mainly weaponized for domestic political use, by blaming the current set of democratic institutions and the past EU-inspired reforms in the energy sector for the "chaos"; an even bigger crisis was anticipated for the winter, which eventually did not materialize.

Assessed Audience: General Population

Risk Assessment: Low to Medium

Potential Impact. The energy crisis remains a serious concern for the Romanian population, as the rising prices have become a burden for households: it is mostly about uncertainty for the future when the current price caps and support schemes put in place by the government will expire.

Currently, the crisis is used to assign blame wholesale on the Western and seed distrust in the national institutions and rules which make us part of the EU. How much will this erode support for Ukraine is yet to be seen, but definitely part of the same story.

Top influencers on subjects related to energy. Source Crowdtangle

Note: the ranking is based on the number of engagements and does not mean that all the popular sources listed are engaged in manipulation and propaganda

Page Name	Total Interactions	Interaction Rate	Total Posts	Video Views	Post Performance	Page Followers
Digi24	345,527	0.06%	425	26,318	1.7x	1.37M
Gheorghe Piperea	265,652	4.43%	38	—	1.2x	157,675
stiripesurse.ro	246,855	0.03%	819	79,664	3.3x	906,830
Anamaria Gavrilă	219,102	23.01%	13	1.52M	11.0x	73,238
Cristian Terhes	182,763	3.24%	15	198,690	1.7x	375,830
Romania TV	174,529	0.05%	232	1.01M	2.4x	1.42M
Observator	169,772	0.03%	307	1.41M	1.6x	1.91M
4media.INFO	138,487	0.63%	131	613,978	2.7x	167,953
Andrei Caramitru	100,597	7.04%	26	—	-1.0x	54,982
StirileProTV	77,863	0.02%	142	1.92M	2.4x	3.13M
Ştefan Mandachi	77,361	2.36%	13	—	1.5x	252,520
Lucian Mindruta	74,174	1.04%	22	—	1.9x	323,933
Ştefan Mandachi	71,703	3.57%	9	1.66M	3.3x	223,134
Epoch Times Romania	70,080	0.1%	130	2,062	1.2x	555,206
Adevărul	69,464	0.02%	378	9,439	1.8x	790,691
Subiectiv cu Razvan Dumitrescu	69,232	1.11%	17	312,160	-1.1x	366,532


Topic analyzed - Correlations between the energy crisis and the war in Ukraine
Time period: February 2022-February 2023
Total posts (forums, blogs, online news, social media)
Estimation of potentially hostile content
ro
80.19%
19.81%
0%
50%
100%
General
Potentially hostile


Topic analyzed - Correlations between the energy crisis and the war in Ukraine
Time period: February 2022-February 2023
Estimation of potentially hostile content by channel
online_news
78.58%
21.42%
facebook
86.91%
blogs
76.72%
23.28%
twitter
95.36%
forums
85.83%
reddit
88.49%
youtube
91.86%
0%
50%
100%
General
Potentially hostile

The alternative? Not explicitly mentioned, apart from the references to human rights and Faith in God; such postings reached 16 000 likes and had 3000 shares. On the other hand, Gheorghe Piperea, mentioned above in this report as an anti-Western influencer, was heavily speculating about a presumed Romanian energy crisis artificially created by our so-called "war overlord", meaning Western powers.

The second one was noted on September 1st when a Tucker Carlson video became viral on the Romanian language internet. Only the page of Sebastian Suciu, a member of the AUR party, had over 266 000 views. The point of the video is to claim that the sanctions against Russia, together with the energy crisis, will take us back to the Dark Ages, and therefore that the cost of the war is too high for our civilization to pay.

Overall, the energy crisis was mainly weaponized for domestic political use, by blaming the current set of democratic institutions and the past EU-inspired reforms in the energy sector for the "chaos"; an even bigger crisis was anticipated for the winter, which eventually did not materialize.
Assessed Audience: General Population

Risk Assessment: Low to Medium

Potential Impact. The energy crisis remains a serious concern for the Romanian population, as the rising prices have become a burden for households: it is mostly about uncertainty for the future when the current price caps and support schemes put in place by the government will expire.

Currently, the crisis is used to assign blame wholesale on the Western and seed distrust in the national institutions and rules which make us part of the EU. How much will this erode support for Ukraine is yet to be seen, but definitely part of the same story.

Energy-related disinformation in the EU

The kinetic war waged by the Russian Federation against Ukraine in the last twelve months, which is in fact a massive escalation of the invasion launched in 2014, was doubled by a battle for the minds and souls of the Europeans. There is a consensus today among observers that the Kremlin's propaganda was less effective than expected, especially in the light of the experience of the past ten years of meddling in Western politics and democratic conversations, encouraging polarization, radicalism, and conspiracies.

Indeed the Ukrainian media and the online community, acting in a similar manner to the traumatized energy system described above, proved to be much more flexible, rapid, and credible with their messages, thus managing to outflank the Russian disinformation machine.

Nevertheless, issues like inflation, the cost of living, and energy supply security remain legitimate concerns for all European citizens in 2023 and beyond.

Being so, they also represent potential subjects to be exploited by the Russian propaganda in order to foment social tensions in the region, or keep its domestic audience sedated with fake stories that "Europe is freezing / about to collapse".

In this report, EFOR has analyzed how the energy-related disinformation functions in two new member states, Hungary and Romania, with contrasting attitudes with respect to the war in Ukraine, and how this rhetoric is intertwined with the domestic energy policies. We found differences but also similarities, and draw a number of interesting conclusions.

Key narratives of the energy-related populism in Hungary

Populism targeting the energy sector is an integral part of the Orban government's overall populist behavior. It has been a feature of official rhetoric for about a decade since the government introduced an undifferentiated utility cost reduction program, which considerably contributed to its repeated electoral success afterward. The program was preceded by a radical pivot in foreign policy towards Moscow and was justified to the public, besides the ideological reasons such as praising Russia's illiberal model, as a rational national strategy to access cheap energy.

1."**Slashing utility prices" (rezsicsökkentés) was a flagship measure** of the Fidesz-KDNP government introduced in 2013, which froze utility prices, e.g. gas, for residential customers. This has remained a campaign slogan in all parliamentary elections afterward (that "the government defends it") and customers are reminded every month how much they save thanks to the government's benevolence: a red text box appears on the monthly bills showing how much the consumer would pay at market prices, in contrast to the actual sum, in white (source: hirado.hu)

2. **Preserving rezsicsökkentés was one of Fidesz's main campaign slogans** before the parliamentary elections of April 2022.

Government officials repeated that keeping gas prices low is only possible if the cheap Russian gas continues to flow, and this was justifying the government's close relations with Russia as an absolute exception in the region after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine: there have been frequent visits to Moscow by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade and other officials. It also served as a reason to oppose the EU's sanctions on the aggressor, albeit just in rhetoric: the Hungarian government silently voted for all of them in Brussels while campaigning loudly against them at home.

3. **Brussels sanctions are blamed for ending the universal rezsicsökkentés**. Cheap Russian gas was largely a myth, as proven recently, and the rezsicsökkentés was not dependent on it; the price capping was just a government ploy to buy votes from the population.

The rising energy prices after 2021 and the fact that this subsidy was undifferentiated, not targeted to those in need, made its costs to the state budget unbearable. When the estimates were published immediately after elections – HUF 1300 billion for the whole year of 2022 if unchanged, i.e. about 3.4bn euro – the government narrowed down the range of beneficiaries significantly from September 2022. As expected, it also blamed Brussels and "Western sanctions" for the necessity to do so.

4. Brussels sanctions are blamed for the end of the price cap on car fuels, too.

Before the April 2022 national elections, the government introduced a price cap on gasoline, which caused a sharp rise in fuel consumption in Hungary for that year (petty parallel export by the gas tank and canister towards neighboring countries contributed to this somewhat), in contrast to all other countries in the region where consumption decreased. Meanwhile, the government opposed the common price cap on Russian gas and oil products introduced by the EU.

When the supply problems started to produce visible chaos at petrol stations in December 2022, the price capping was terminated abruptly, and "Brussels' sanctions" were also blamed for this.

5."National consultation" and the full-scale campaign against the EU's sanctions. The government launched a "national consultation" in the form of a direct marketing campaign, sending a letter to each household. The letter contains seven misleading questions with manipulative explanations based on fear-mongering and scapegoating. The "consultation" was accompanied by a large-scale information campaign employing every possible tool, from billboards and public broadcasting advertisements, to canvassing by pro-government influencers. At the end of it, the same billboards were flooded with the message that "97% of Hungarians say no to sanctions".

6. Scapegoating and propaganda. "War energy prices", "sanctions' inflation", "war inflation" and above all "Brussels' sanctions" are keywords constantly used by government officials, the entire media close to FIDESZ, and individual propagandists, in order to blame "Brussels" for the country's financial hardships. According to this narrative, the sanctions against the Russian Federation do not work, harming Europe more than Moscow.

This propaganda seems to be by and largely effective, according to a recent study: 36% of the total population and 50% of Fidesz voters think that the Hungarian government did not vote in favor of the sanctions (which is false: it did) and 53% of all respondents claim that gas prices on the market increased due to the sanctions.

Key narratives of the energy-related populism in Romania

Mirroring the situation in Hungary, a number of populist narratives related to the subject of energy can also be identified in the Romanian language conversations.

1. We have enough gas, oil – and in general energy resources to satisfy our needs; why can't we set lower prices for "our energy", stop all exports and let the EU burn?

The first part is, as indicated before, a myth: Romania produces domestically only two-thirds of the gas and a third of the oil and the refinery products it consumes. The rest was imported until 2022 from various sources, mainly from- or via- Russia, which is to say that the situation is not so radically different from the rest of Europe, as many would-be patriots believe. Apart from that, as members of the common market, we cannot stop the import-export and close the borders anyway. What is more, the excessive reliance on theoretical reserves of gas under the Black Sea or onshore favors populist policies to increase consumption.

The focus of Romania's de facto energy policy is to "connect all households to gas" and replace state-owned coal-fired plants with equivalent state-owned capacities on gas, instead of opening up the market and favoring more ambitious investments in renewables. Being so, the push comes also squarely against Brussel's RepowerEU plan.

2**. The strategic industrial sectors should get cheap energy – since it is "our energy" anyway, see point 1 – because they are important for the GDP, create jobs, and make us proud and independent.**

There is a long history of using preferential energy prices (electricity, natural gas) for selected economic operators with political connections. Such price distortions were actually inherited from the Communist regime and were an economic plague, perpetuating inefficiency and large-scale clientelism. It took Romania decades of efforts and some high-profile court cases to terminate such "industrial policies" which never added, but in fact, subtracted social value and were benefiting only narrow vested interests.

The narrative remains nevertheless popular with the broader public and is embraced by influencers who want to appear smart and technocratic, not to mention those who have an explicit agenda to lobby in favor of the said vested interests. Incidentally, the isolation of the domestic gas market rendered the national producers unable to export. This had been the situation for many years before the reforms in 2012-2017, and played straight into Gazprom's hand: the Russians did not have to worry about regional competition. While the industrial consumers had to adapt in the past five years to market conditions, this myth continues to influence public policies, blocking the developments of gas in the Black Sea: allegedly these should be used "for domestic consumers", and not "be exported to the West" or "to Hungary".

3. Privatization and liberalization in the energy sector were big policy mistakes, and they were forced upon us by Brussels; we should re-nationalize everything and then apply points 1 and 2.

This narrative is based on statements of fact that are plain wrong, but this does not make it less appealing. After years of studies, we know by now that successful disinformation takes place not only when people don't know the facts, but also when they want very much to believe in their own alternative – i.e. fake – facts, and so willingly cluster around sources feeding them such info and shut off the others.

Namely, the vast majority of the energy sector in Romania is – and has always been – owned by the state: it controls 80% of the power generation (coal, gas, hydro, nuclear) and half of the natural gas production. The only significant private (of sorts) operator present is the Austrian group OMV, which owns 51% of the privatized oil and gas company Petrom; the Romanian state holds 21%, and 28% is floated on the stock exchange. In spite of representing only half of the gas extraction and less than a tenth of electricity generation, OMV-Petrom is the lightning rod for all the populist campaigns to "get our resources back under state control" or, more clearly, "foreign multinationals bought

Romania's energy resources in order to exploit us". In general, the anti-multinational discourse has traction in public opinion: a survey in 2021 found that Romanians blame foreign companies for the pollution in the country (56%, vs 35% placing the blame on domestic companies) and for the illegal logging (47% vs 45%).
The exceptional profits made in 2022 by the whole energy sector in Europe, a result of the price rises, did not make the situation easier: inordinate amounts of time and energy were spent by the government in the effort to implement the EU rules to tax windfall profits, while dog-whistling to the public that this is all about "the Austrians who export the profit".

There was no attempt to estimate and show how much extra money would be collected from the budget by this move, since all the rest of the production in the sector already belongs to the state, so the sums would switch from one pocket of the state to another. Romania's failed bid to join the Schengen area at the end of 2022, blocked by the conservative chancellor in Vienna, sparked additional wrath against Austrian companies. The government engaged in a full-blown legalistic battle to impose additional taxes on OMV-Petrom at the end of 2022 and in early 2023.

The government engaged in a full-blown legalistic battle to impose additional taxes on OMV-Petrom at the end of 2022 and in early 2023.

The irony is that, in the end, the Austrian government has a smaller indirect stake in Petrom (about 17%) than Romania's (21%), even leaving aside that the 28% free float is largely owned by Romania's pension funds.

The connection made by trolls and propagandists between the recent price increases and the EU-agreed liberalization in the energy sector implemented in the past years is also spurious: the timing of actions does not match. But, as before, the facts cannot stay in the way of a good anti-EU disinformation narrative.

4. The United States has created this artificial energy crisis (maybe in cahoots with Putin?) in order to impoverish Europe and get rich by selling us LNG. Alternatively, the Norwegians get even richer than they are by selling expensive gas to the EU.

There is little to comment on these half-truths put in a manipulative context because, as already shown, people who are already inclined to believe conspiracies will continue to consume and distribute them no matter what arguments they are offered: such stories satisfy a deeply emotional and identity need, to belong to a circle of insiders who "see the truth". It is much more interesting to identify the influencers and amplifiers who use this narrative strategically for building an audience and making a profit from it. To this day, Romania has not imported one single molecule of Norwegian pipeline gas or American LNG due to obvious geographic and infrastructure constraints.

5. Stop helping the Republic of Moldova, or Ukraine, because they are ungrateful / belong to Russia anyway / occupy territories that are ours / don't want to unite with us (Moldova) / etc

It is true that in the second part of 2022, Romania assisted the Republic of Moldova with gas, electricity, and some quantities of fuels at below-market prices, when the government in Chişinău was in a dire situation and totally dependent on Russia for energy supplies. But this is not true about Ukraine, where Romania like many other countries delivered just humanitarian aid; the energy deals, to the extent they existed, were contractual and market-based. On the contrary, from end-June to October 10th – the date when Russia launched its targeted and massive attacks on Ukraine's electricity system – Romania was a net importer of cheaper electricity from Ukraine and had a deliberate policy to do so, benefiting our domestic consumers.

This probably reduced slightly the pressure on prices in the second half of the year compared to what they would have been otherwise and certainly reduced the consumption of natural gas used to produce electricity in inefficient plants, allowing us to save it for storage over the winter.

In regards to Moldova, Romania has more substantial obligations: almost one million Moldovans are estimated to have Romanian citizenship and, in theory, should enjoy the same rights and benefits in relation to the Romanian state. After all, the same populists repeat loudly that "the state-owned power and gas" should be distributed at affordable prices to the Romanian citizens, and not only when they count as votes.

A number of interesting conclusions can be drawn from these observations. In contrast to the situation in Hungary, in Romania the fake news and pro-Russian propaganda based on energy topics come largely from independent influencers active on social networks and a number of conspiratorial TV and radio stations; much less are the public officials or state media channels the origin of such statements. The energy populism bubble overlaps more or less with the anti-vax ecosystem which was active until recently and has meanwhile shifted towards the more direct anti-Ukraine rhetoric.

Another difference from Hungary is the fact that Romania has still some domestic production of oil and natural gas, though the reserves are declining and do not cover the current consumption, as explained above, so part of the fossil fuels still have to be imported. This reality does not however stop some people from cherishing the mythical "energy independence", understood as self-sufficiency and isolation from the turbulent international markets, which was one of the general economic objectives of the Ceauşescu regime and remained a rallying cry for various nostalgic-nationalist parties over the past three decades. A certain revival of "we don't sell our country" memes of the mid-90s when the privatization of industrial assets was carried out, can also be observed here, just with a new generation of cheerleaders in charge.

What is however true for both Hungary and Romania is that **most of the manipulation and propaganda discourse seems to be originating at home.**

It is much less copy-pasted from Russian sources, as one may have assumed, although a wealth of attractive material is offered by them free of charge.

This is in line with the findings of a recent study by EU Disinfo which discovered that of all the content created by the pro-Kremlin propaganda apparatus, 44% targets the Russian-speaking populations in Russky Mir and the diaspora, while 36% targets the English-speaking public, i.e. the general international audience.

Only the remaining 20% is packaged for other national publics, among which Spanish, German, and Serbian (!) languages are a priority; Romanian and Hungarian are distant residuals, not even showing up in statistics.

A separate note here should be made for the Romanian-speaking population of the Republic of Moldova, which is largely bilingual and so exposed to the direct energy-related propaganda in Russian meant for the Russkiy Mir: they were not covered in our brief survey.

office@expertforum.ro
(+40) 21 211 7400
str. Semilunei 7, apt 1, București, Sector 2
Postal code 020797

The sole responsibility for any content supported by the European Media and Information Fund lies with the author(s) and it may not necessarily reflect the positions of the EMIF and the Fund Partners, the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation and the European University Institute.

European
MEDIA AND
INFORMATION
Fund

Managed by
Calouste Gulbenkian
Foundation