The Vot Correct coalition launched the preliminary conclusions of the 9 June election observation activity. The report includes data on the voting day, but also on the process of organizing the elections, the registration of candidates, the financing of the campaign or the electoral campaign.
The VotCorect coalition is composed of Expert Forum (EFOR) , CIVICA , CSD (Centre for the Study of Democracy), The Civic Resource Centre, Rădăuțiul Civic and Observatorul Electoral. Code for Romania developed the Vote Monitor application. In the Republic of Moldova we collaborated with Promo-LEX , and in Romania with international observers accredited by the European Platform for Democratic Elections – EPDE .
The Vot Corect Coalition has released the preliminary conclusions of its election observation activities for the June 9 elections. The report includes data about election day, as well as information on the organization of the electoral process, candidate registration, campaign financing, and the election campaign itself.
The elections represented a process with multiple electoral options, but competitiveness was reduced due to the coalition of the main governing parties and the amendment of the electoral law shortly before the elections. Authorities organized the process efficiently, but the consolidation of the elections increased procedural complexity and necessitated the development of numerous interpretive decisions regarding the legislation. The electoral law demonstrated its limitations, and the lack of an Electoral Code was evident.
The overlap of the two elections highlighted campaign themes related to local elections, with political activity focusing on this competition. Unfortunately, the campaign was also marked by some violent incidents, including a serious one on election day.
The process of registering candidates for the European Parliament elections is restrictive, affecting electoral competition, and the verification of support signatures remains formal. In local elections, there was a decrease in the number of lists that did not include candidates of both sexes accepted by constituency commissions, although their existence remains an issue. Despite an increase in the number of female candidates compared to the last local elections, the participation of women in elections, in eligible positions, remains low.
Voter information was not the subject of widespread campaigns. The procedure for the active registration of community voters for the European Parliament elections was insufficiently disseminated.
The transparency of campaign financing was ensured by the constant publication of data by the Permanent Electoral Authority (PEA), but it was seriously affected by significant pre-campaign expenses conducted without applying campaign transparency rules. The constant use of subsidies for media and propaganda gave the governing parties a significant advantage well before the start of the electoral campaign. Election day was generally orderly, but the complexity of the procedures affected the efficiency of voting and the understanding of electoral procedures by voters and the electoral administration in polling stations. Additionally, one of the effects of the numerous procedures was the significant pressure placed on the members of the electoral administration. Voting abroad was efficiently organized, with extended options for exercising the right to vote. The elections were monitored by numerous national and international organizations accredited by the PEA. In some localities, the involvement of observers potentially associated with political parties in the organization of polling stations and the electoral process was reported.
The issues highlighted by observation reports during the counting process seemed to be caused more by the complexity of the process and the heavy workload on polling station offices than by any intention to distort the results. The vote-counting process was described by observers as tiring and lengthy.
Legislative Framework
The legislative framework for organizing European Parliament and local elections is complex. The primary legislation, consisting mainly of two electoral laws (33/2007 and 115/2015) and Emergency Ordinance (GEO) 21/2024, has been supplemented by numerous decisions from the Central Electoral Bureau (CEB) and the Permanent Electoral Authority (PEA). This fragmented legislative framework has caused confusion among both voters and those involved in organizing the elections. Once again, the necessity for a unified Electoral Code with standardized procedures was highlighted in the elections on June 9th.
The merging of the elections was decided by the Government through GEO 21/2024 on 8 March, very shortly before the deadline for issuing the decisions for organizing the European Parliament elections. In addition to establishing the legal framework for merging the elections, the ordinance also addressed certain legislative gaps, particularly regarding Law 33/2007 for organizing European Parliament elections. EFOR had pointed out as early as autumn 2023 that the legislation for the European Parliament elections was unclear and insufficiently aligned with the major legislative changes in recent years in electoral matters.
EFOR criticized the change in the method of setting-up electoral bureaus, which limits the representation of certain political parties, the allowance of political migration by regulating the possibility for local elected officials to change the party they represent, and the use of emergency ordinances as a means of regulation in this matter. On 14 May, the Constitutional Court ruled that the emergency ordinance was constitutional regarding the justification of urgency and the modification of the method used for setting up the electoral commissions. The decision to merge the elections should have been made in Parliament, especially since it was well-known that there would be four rounds of elections in 2024. There is already Constitutional Court jurisprudence on the regulations regarding the migration of mayors, which found this practice unconstitutional (for example, Constitutional Court Decision 761/2014, which finds that OUG 55/2014 violates Article 147, paragraph (4) of the Constitution concerning the situation of local and county councilors).
Although a public debate on the draft emergency ordinance was organized, the preparation time was too short. Several interlocutors emphasized that the ordinance did not address all legislative gaps, negatively affecting the electoral process. Additionally, issuing emergency ordinances to regulate only the current elections – as was done in 2019 and this year – is a flawed practice that creates unpredictability.
One of the negative effects of merging the elections was the issuance of a large number of decisions by the Central Electoral Bureau to compensate for the lack of clarity in the legal framework. This aspect was highlighted by several VotCorect interlocutors, and one of the direct effects was an increase in the complexity of the electoral process. The large number of activities in the electoral calendar created difficulties for public institutions in implementing it. The BEC decision regarding the use of the special ballot box (issued at the recommendation of VotCorect) was a positive one as it simplifies and clarifies the mechanism for exercising the right to vote.
Electoral Administration
Despite the difficulties created by the merging of elections within a fragmented and insufficient legislative framework, which was inadequately supplemented by GEO 21/2024, the PEA and the CEB organized the election efficiently. Although the CEB issued numerous decisions to standardize certain aspects of the process, it could not, within the limits of its legal powers, fully resolve the discrepancies between the two electoral laws not covered by GEO 21/2024.
The formation of electoral bureaus was modified by GEO 21/2024 much later than recommended by the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters; moreover, the modification reduced political representation, disadvantaging parties that would have had greater representation in local elections and those not represented in the European Parliament in 2019.
Following some complaints, the CEB identified irregularities in the random selection process of presidents and deputies of some local constituency bureaus (non-compliance with the proximity criterion and inclusion of non-judiciary personnel on the nomination lists) and ordered their annulment and repetition in certain counties.
The CEB decisions were promptly published on its website, but the fact that meetings were not public reduced the transparency of the process. For the first time, a request for a meeting with civil society observers was approved, a good practice that should be continued in future elections.
Voter information about the electoral process remained almost exclusively online and was not the subject of widespread campaigns. Despite significant new developments impacting election day, such as the deadline for establishing residence, these were not sufficiently promoted.
Most interlocutors expressed confidence in the professionalism and impartiality of the PEA and electoral bureaus at all four levels of electoral administration.
The training materials prepared for the polling station electoral bureaus were clear and comprehensive. While the Vot Corect team could not systematically observe the training sessions, sporadic information indicated differences in their organization at the constituency level, particularly regarding the number of participants.
Voter registration and the voter lists
VotCorect interlocutors generally expressed confidence in the accuracy of the electoral register and voter lists.
GEO 21/2024 stipulated that only voters who obtained a residence visa 60 days before the election could vote in the local elections in the residence constituency. This provision, given the adoption of the GEO very close to the deadline for setting the election date, left relatively little time for voter registration. It also represents a departure from a rule that came into effect for the first time this year (which introduced a six month period for obtaining the visa), which can cause confusion.
For the active registration of community voters for the European Parliament elections, a much broader information campaign should have been organized. Although the PEA published a set of instructions, its dissemination remained limited. Vot Corect observers reported several cases where eligible individuals who submitted their registration applications on time were not registered and could not vote.
Following a decision by the CEB on June 7, at the request of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoI), the PEA printed 19,766 additional ballots for 54 localities in eight counties, where the number of voters with residences had significantly increased. Transparency regarding the establishment of residence addresses was low, as the significant increase in registrations before elections is a recurring problem that affects the electoral process in certain constituencies. CEB decision was made very late, especially considering that the deadline for obtaining a residence visa was April 10, and the exact situation was known by authorities.
Candidate registration
Candidate registration took place at two different levels, at the CEB for the European Parliament elections and at the local constituency offices for the local elections. In Romanian EP elections, the registration conditions are among the most restrictive in the European Union, limiting the possibility of a broader electoral competition. The large number of signatures – 200,000 for parties and alliances and 100,000 for independent candidates – complicates the process of verifying candidacy files.
The large number of signatures does not necessarily ensure the representativeness of the competitors and rather encourages the use of illegal collection methods. The legislative framework and practical mechanisms do not provide the CEB with many options to reject candidacies if the signatures are not deemed to be genuine and legally collected, as oversight is only done on form and substance. Although the CEB did not file any criminal complaints for the June 2024 elections, independent candidate Silvestru Șoșoacă is under criminal investigation for the use of illegal signatures. The unexpected entry into the electoral race without prior campaigning by some candidates or parties raises questions about the integrity of data collection methods.
The CEB registered the candidacies of 12 parties and 4 independent candidates. Women represent 32% of the candidates. The candidacies of the United Diaspora Party were initially rejected due to insufficient signatures. Subsequently, the court decided to accept the candidacies because the supporter lists were destroyed by a flood and, under these circumstances, could no longer be verified.
For the local elections, 207,390 candidates were registered, fewer than in 2016 and 2020. Women represent 24% of the candidates. The data was published by the CEB in a centralized format over a week after the finalization of the candidacies, revealing that 467 lists submitted for local councils (3%) do not comply with the provisions of Article 7 of Law 115/2015, meaning they do not ensure representation of both sexes on the electoral lists, a rule applicable to lists containing more than 2 persons. Although these lists do not meet this condition, they were not declared null. The lack of statistics about the age of candidates prevents us from determining if all of them were of legal age. Regarding the publication of candidate data, the legislative framework is outdated, limiting the possibilities for challenging candidacies. Despite multiple requests submitted to the CEB and the constituency offices in Bucharest, the VotCorect coalition could not observe the verification of these signatures. The limited publication of candidate data restricts the real possibility of challenging candidacies, and the 48-hour deadline is unrealistic.
From the published data, it appears that approximately 400 mayors changed their party and ran on behalf of a different party than the one they were elected with in 2020, as a result of GEO 21/2024.
Electoral campaign
The number of electoral debates was reduced, and the messages addressed to the electorate were often vague and outlined in general terms. Although the alliance for the European parliamentary elections between the two major parties was not replicated in the local elections except in a relatively small number of localities, the political context created reduced political confrontation among the candidates designated by the respective parties.
The campaign for the European parliamentary elections was overshadowed by the one for the local elections. European interest topics were absent from the political discourse, and the remaining space seems to have provided more echo to the anti-European sovereign discourse of some competitors.
Similarly, the discourse of the local campaign did not contain many topics of interest to the electorate, and cases where competitors resorted to personal attacks and slanderous messages were frequent. Regrettably, the campaign was also marked by some violent incidents, including a serious one on the day of the elections, reported in Bucharest. Attempts to manipulate the electorate were identified in the frequent publication of opinion polls with very different results, which were criticized by sociologists as lacking credibility, unprofessional, and based on faulty methodology. Contrary to the provisions of the law, some polls were published even on the day of the elections.
As in other elections, outdoor campaign visibility was very low compared to the pre-campaign period, due to restrictive regulations regarding electoral display. The campaign, however, was visible and active online, with most parties and candidates choosing social networks as the preferred medium to convey their message to the electorate.
Campaign financing
From a legal standpoint, the financing of the electoral campaign took place separately for the two types of elections, following similar rules. The PEA published two guides on campaign financing, which were subject to public debate, and organized several training seminars for the financial representatives of the parties. The overlap of the two types of elections created difficulties for some competitors with lower capacity to identify financial representatives, especially since the campaign period overlapped with the deadline for filing annual financial reports. Some interlocutors emphasized the difficulty of ensuring the reporting activities for two types of elections in parallel. Although on paper the two campaigns are financed differently, in practice, VotCorect found that there was in some cases a de facto overlap of campaign actions, which favored parties with significant resources.
The revenues of the competitors were 110 million lei for the European parliamentary elections and 205 million lei for the local elections, with expenses of 106 million lei and 171 million lei, respectively. It is encouraging that, although there is no legal obligation, the PEA published statistics on the competitors’ transactions every week. However, the quality of the data could be improved to allow for more efficient processing. This year, expenditures were also published for the first time, contributing to increased transparency. Competitors spent the most on online (36%), radio/TV/press (35%), and clothing for party teams (10%) during the EP elections.
Competitors did not use subsidies, and the campaign was funded by private funds, with minor exceptions. Paradoxically, in certain parties – the most prominent case being that of AUR – candidates at the bottom of the list made significant financial contributions to the EP campaign. Legitimate questions arise about their interest in funding a campaign that is unlikely to result in a mandate as a member of the EP after the elections, raising suspicions of possible indirect campaign funding by third parties.
Transparency in electoral campaign financing is also reduced due to the defective legislative model adopted in Romania since 2015, which allows for significant spending before the start of the actual electoral campaign. Unlike the campaign period, during the pre-campaign period, political parties can spend significant resources without similar transparency obligations as during the campaign (for example, there is no obligation to mark electoral materials). Pre-campaign financing expenses are reported only the following year in the annual reports on the financing of political parties, which further delays and reduces transparency in the process. Additionally, individuals intending to run as independents can incur expenses during the pre-campaign period without transparency obligations associated with these expenses.
Analyses published by Expert Forum have also revealed that money was spent online during the electoral campaign by third parties disguised as publications, which were also promoted through Facebook Ads. In the case of AUR, we identified several pages that extensively promoted the candidates and functioned as newspapers.
Election Observation
The PEA accredited 102 civil society organizations and 87 international observers representing 28 organizations, according to information published on the institution’s website. From the first category, five accredited organizations are members of the Vot Corect coalition; among the international observers, two organizations observed in partnership with Vot Corect – Promo-Lex and European Platform for Democratic Elections – and Election-Watch EU had Vot Corect as its national representative. A few days before the election, the Vot Corect team participated in a meeting with ODIHR observers.
At the beginning of the electoral period, the Vot Corect team requested meetings with the main institutions involved in organizing the elections and other participants in the electoral process. We would like to thank the institutions that agreed to discuss with the Vot Corect team or allowed us access to observe how they conduct their activities – the Permanent Electoral Authority, the Central Electoral Bureau, the Special Telecommunications Service, the electoral office for polling stations abroad, the electoral office of sector 1, all the electoral offices of the polling stations visited by observers), and other interlocutors for their openness and the information provided for this report. We also thank the representatives of the political parties who met with the Vot Corect team.
For election day, Expert Forum organized an assistance center for voters and observers, composed of the toll-free service 0800 460 002 and the platform www.votcorect.ro. Over 400 complaints and questions related to electoral procedures were recorded through the call center.
Vot Corect member organizations accredited over 800 observers in the country and abroad, who have so far submitted information from 925 polling stations through the Vote Monitor application developed by Code for Romania. The application allowed the processing of this data in real-time; observation reports from observers who did not use the application will be included only in the final report. The distribution of observers in the territory also depended on their options, so the statistical relevance of the sample of observed sections may be affected by the fact that in some counties, the number of observers was higher than in others.
During the voting, observers were well received, and the requested information was provided to them by the electoral offices in 95% of cases; unfortunately, cases of intimidation of observers were also reported. Regarding the transparency of the process overall, it was assessed as good and very good in over 90% of the sections visited during voting but only in 70% of cases during the vote count. Vot Corect observers encountered observers accredited by other organizations in 40% of sections.
Election Day
Opening of polling stations
Observers evaluated the opening procedure as good or very good in over 95% of the observed sections. Polling stations opened on time, with only 9 out of 262 reported exceptions. Observers also noted the presence of unauthorized individuals during the opening process in a concerning proportion (25 out of 258 reported sections); in 7 out of 260 reported sections, unauthorized persons intervened in the opening process.
Voting
The organization of polling stations was generally good, although observers highlighted irregularities related to crowded or disorganized polling stations and pressures on voters. Frequently reported issues include confusion about how to vote in the two types of elections and regarding the polling stations where voters cast their ballots. In some cases, voters’ right to vote was limited due to misunderstandings of procedures and faulty application of legal norms.
In 5% of the observed sections, electoral materials were inadequate – the most frequent complaints were related to the absence of stamps. Irregularities arising from the way ballots were received in several polling stations were reported, with ballots grouped in batches for the same position. In this context, cases were reported where voters received multiple ballots of the same type.
The atmosphere was tense in 11% of the observed polling stations. Unauthorized individuals were present in 6% of the sections, and unauthorized persons intervened in the process in 5% of the sections. Congestion was observed in 30% of the observed sections.
On election day, the involvement of representatives of organizations such as Millennium for Human Rights in the electoral process was observed, including through massive presence in some polling stations and involvement in their organization.
Vote counting and tabulation
Vote counting proved to be a difficult and time-consuming process; several observers commented on the large volume of work and the effort made by the polling station bureau members. Observers appreciated that the validity of votes was determined according to reasonable and consistently applied criteria in 95% of the observed sections, but the presidents of the PEBs encountered difficulties in completing the verbal processes in 22% of cases, and in 33% of cases, PEB members filled in the verbal processes in blank. Indications of falsification of results reported by observers represented less than 2% of the total reports, compared to significant procedural errors in almost 15%. Ballots of the same type were folded together in the urn in 10% of the visited sections. In almost 23% of the reports, individuals outside the PEB participated in the counting.